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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONFESSION, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Gary A. Udashen *
Robert Udashen**
HIS Article reviews the major cases in the areas of confession, search,
and seizure from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Texas courts
of appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The United States Supreme Court addressed no confession or search
and seizure issues during its last term.
I. TEXAS CASES
A trend toward the use of independent state grounds as a basis for sup-
pressing illegally obtained evidence, which began during the last survey pe-
riod, has continued. Several cases discussed in this Article show the
necessity of concentrating on Texas constitutional and statutory authority as
a basis for challenging improper arrests and searches, regardless of contrary
holdings from the United States Supreme Court.
A. THE STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In Nix v. Williams' the United States Supreme Court held that unlawfully
seized evidence is admissible in court if the evidence inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means.2 In other words, the evidence is admissi-
ble if the prosecution can show that the outcome of the law enforcement
investigation was not affected by the police illegality. The Supreme Court
reasoned that in such a situation the deterrence rationale of the federal ex-
clusionary rule has so little basis that the evidence should be received.3
In Garcia v. State4 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined to carve
out an "inevitable discovery" exception to the state statutory exclusionary
rule.5 The court stated that because Texas law provides an independent ba-
* B.A., The University of Texas, J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
2. Id. at 448.
3. Id. at 447.
4. 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
5. Id. at 798. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 38.23(a) provides in perti-
nent part:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions
of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws
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sis for the exclusion of evidence, the federal inevitable discovery exception is
irrelevant to state law.6 The Texas statute does not, on its face, contain an
inevitable discovery exception. 7 It therefore absolutely requires the exclu-
sion of all unlawfully seized evidence." The court of criminal appeals re-
fused to judicially create an exception to a statute that cannot fairly be read
to include such an exception.9
The strict construction of the state statutory exclusionary rule and the
deference to legislative intent that the court of criminal appeals displayed in
Garcia was also exhibited by the court in Fuller v. State.t0 There, Aaron
Fuller was charged with capital murder. During the punishment phase of
the capital murder trial, the State offered into evidence a sexually explicit
audio tape recording made by Fuller. Fuller had given this tape to a female
inmate in the county jail. Another inmate stole the tape and delivered it to
the authorities. Fuller objected to the admission of the tape in evidence
against him because it was stolen in violation of the law. The court of crimi-
nal appeals declined to interpret the language of article 38.23(a)II in such a
way as to confer standing on Fuller to complain about the theft of the tape. 12
Although the court recognized that article 38.23(a) might be read to confer
third party standing on a criminal defendant, the court declined "to work
such a fundamental change in this State's elemental law of standing without
a rather more explicit indication of legislative intent."'1 3
In a case of first impression, the San Antonio court of appeals addressed
the question of whether evidence obtained by the State in violation of the
criminal trespass law 14 is admissible at trial.1 5 That court strictly construed
article 38.23(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to bar the introduction of
such evidence. 16
These cases can certainly be used to argue against any judicially created
exceptions to the state exclusionary rule. Unless and until the legislature
amends article 38.23, defendants should challenge the application of such
of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the ac-
cused on the trial of any criminal case.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
6. Garcia, 829 S.W.2d at 798.
7. The only exception to the state statutory exclusionary rule is in article 38.23(b) of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. It reads as follows: "[ilt is an exception to the provisions
of Subsection (a) of this Article that the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer
acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on
probable cause." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
8. Garcia, 829 S.W.2d at 798.
9. Id. at 799.
10. 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), petition for cert. filed, No. 92-5344 (Jul. 20,
1992).
11. See supra note 5.
12. Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 202.
13. Id.; cf State v. Bassano, 827 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, pet.
ref'd)(mere allegation by accused that he was a victim of illegal search or seizure, if not chal-
lenged by the State, is sufficient to establish standing).
14. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (Vernon 1989).
15. State v. Hobbs, 824 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, pet. ref'd).
16. Id. at 319.
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judicially created exceptions to the state exclusionary rule under the in-
dependent source doctrine. The simple fact that Supreme Court authority
allows introduction of seized items as a matter of federal constitutional juris-
prudence should never end the inquiry as to whether the items are admissi-
ble in a Texas state prosecution. Clearly, article 38.23 provides greater
protection against admissibility of illegally obtained evidence than the
United States Constitution.
B. THE PRETEXT ARREST DOCTRINE
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in Black v. State17 that "[a]n
arrest for one crime is not permitted to be used as a pretext to search for
evidence of another."18 According to the court in Black, if an arrest is used
as a pretext, it "s an illegal arrest and evidence discovered as a result of it
may not be used at trial.' 9
The pretext arrest doctrine, as the rule in Black was known, came to an
end in Garcia v. State.20 There the court defined a "pretext arrest" as an
objectively valid stop for an allegedly improper reason, i.e., to investigate the
arrested person for an offense other than the offense for which he was ar-
rested. 2' After reviewing a number of federal decisions, 22 the court con-
cluded that "the validity of an arrest or stop should be determined solely by
analyzing objectively the facts surrounding the event."' 23 The court stated
that it made little sense to maintain the pretext arrest doctrine in order to
deter the subjectively bad intentions of law enforcement personnel that do
not result in any objectively ascertainable violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment.24 The court held that law enforcement officers are free to enforce the
laws and detain a person for an actual violation of the law regardless of the
usual practices or standards of the local law enforcement agency and regard-
less of the officer's subjective reasons for the detention. 25
Garcia shifts the focus from a subjective analysis of the arresting officer's
intent to an objective analysis of the officer's conduct in making an arrest.
This does not mean, however, that evidence of an officer's intent is irrele-
vant. It would certainly be proper to explore an officer's intent in evaluating
the officer's credibility when he describes his actions in arresting the
defendant.
In Garcia the court made clear that the decision was based strictly upon
17. 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
18. Id. at 243 (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)).
19. Id. at 244.
20. 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); accord, Hamilton v. State, 831 S.W.2d 326
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
21. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 939-40.
22. The court particularly relied on the en bane decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
bane).
23. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 943.




the United States Constitution.26 Specifically, the court recognized that
Heitman v. State27 would allow the state courts to interpret article I, section
9 of the Texas Constitution 28 differently than the interpretation given by the
federal courts to the Fourth Amendment. Because, however, since the ap-
pellant in Garcia failed to raise a claim under the Texas Constitution, the
court declined to address it.
C. ARREST VS. INVESTIGATORY DETENTION
In Amores v. State29 the court of criminal appeals discussed the difference
between an arrest and an investigative detention. According to the court, an
arrest occurs when a person's liberty of movement is restricted or re-
strained. 30 An arrest must be supported by probable cause.3 1 An investiga-
tive detention, however, "may be founded upon a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the person detained is connected with criminal activity."'3 2
This is because the purpose of an investigative detention is to allow the po-
lice to briefly question a suspicious person regarding his identity, his reason
for being where he is, and to make similar reasonable inquiries which are
truly investigatory. 33 An investigative detention is therefore a lesser intru-
sion upon a person's freedom. The distinction between an arrest and an
investigative detention is important because the scope of a permissible search
depends on whether the suspect is validly under arrest or whether he has
merely been detained for purposes of investigation.
A police officer ordered Jorge Amores from his car at gunpoint, placed
him face-down on the ground with his hands behind his back, and told him
he would be shot if he did not obey. The State argued that Amores was
merely investigatively detained. According to the State, the discovery of a
handgun in Amores's vehicle, while Amores lay prone on the ground, pro-
vided probable cause to arrest Amores. The court rejected the State's argu-
ment and held that Amores was under arrest prior to the discovery of the
handgun. 34 The discovery of the weapon after Amores was arrested could
not be used to provide probable cause for the arrest. 35 Subsequently discov-
ered facts "cannot retrospectively serve to bolster probable cause at the time
26. Id. at 943 n.8.
27. 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Court of Criminal Appeals, when analyzing
and interpreting search and seizure provision of the Texas Constitution, will not be bound by
U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the comparable Fourth Amendment issue).
28. Article I, section 9, of the Texas Constitution states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions,
from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place,
or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as
may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
TEX. CONST., art. I, § 9.
29. 816 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
30. Id. at 411.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 412.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 413.
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of the arrest."' 36 If the court had found the detention of Amores to be an
investigatory detention rather than an arrest, the discovery of the gun could
have been considered in assessing the ultimate probable cause for the arrest.
The defendant in Burkes v. State37 benefitted from the decision in Amores
when he appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine. Burkes had the
misfortune to run into a police officer while hurriedly leaving an area well-
known as a place where drugs were illegally sold and used. The officer or-
dered Burkes to lie down on the ground, handcuffed Burkes, and then patted
him down. The patdown revealed a plastic snuff can containing cocaine.
The court of criminal appeals held that handcuffing Burkes and placing him
on the ground constituted an arrest and not a mere investigatory detention. 38
The court was aided in reaching this conclusion by the fact that the officer
did not question Burkes prior to handcuffing and searching him.39 The
court remanded Burkes to the court of appeals for a determination as to
whether there was probable cause for the arrest.40
D. PROBABLE CAUSE
In order to effect an arrest, it is necessary to have probable cause to believe
that the arrested person has committed or is committing an offense.
41
Whether probable cause exists is determined in Texas by applying the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test.42 An officer has probable cause to make an
arrest when "the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and
of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a particular
person has committed or is committing an offense." '43 This definition of
probable cause sounds simple. The application of this definition is, however,
often open to dispute.
A critical question in A mores v. State44 was whether a police broadcast of
a burglary in progress, at a particular apartment complex, involving a black
male, provided probable cause for a police officer to arrest a black male in a
vehicle in the parking lot of the complex. While an officer certainly has the
right to act upon such a broadcast,45 if there are no facts other than the
broadcast known to the arresting officer that give rise to probable cause for
an arrest, then the state must establish the facts known to the dispatcher in
order to support a finding of probable cause.46 In other words, some police
official must have sufficient knowledge to possess probable cause. In Amores
the State failed to prove the dispatcher knew the identity of the person call-
36. Id. at 415.
37. 830 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
38. Id. at 925.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 925-26.
41. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
42. Id. at 413.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 416.
46. Id. at 414-16.
1993] 1241
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ing in the report of the burglary in progress.47 The call was the equivalent of
an anonymous tip which alone is insufficient to establish probable cause.48
The arresting officer, who also did not know the identity of the caller, relied
upon the broadcast from the dispatcher in arresting the appellant. Since
neither the dispatcher nor the arresting officer possessed sufficient facts to
establish probable cause, the warrantless arrest was found to be unauthor-
ized because it did not meet the requirements of article 14.04 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.49
In concluding that there was a lack of probable cause, the court in Amores
made clear that "it is 'state law and not federal law that governs the legality
of a state arrest so long as that law does not violate federal constitutional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.' -5o
Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure5" allows war-
rantless arrests in Texas only in limited circumstances. 52 The court has pre-
viously held that Chapter Fourteen requires the legal equivalent of
47. Id. at 415.
48. Id. at 416.
49. Id. at 414-15. Article 14.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states:
Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representa-
tion of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender
is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace
officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977 and Supp. 1993).
50. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413 (quoting Milton v. State, 549 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977)).
51. Chapter 14, in pertinent part, states the following:
Article 14.01. Offense within view
(a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an
offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the
offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace.
(b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense
committed in his presence or within his view.
Article 14.02. Within view of magistrate
A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, when a felony or breach of the
peace has been committed in the presence or within the view of a magistrate,
and such magistrate verbally orders the arrest of the offender.
Article 14.03. Authority of peace officers
(a) Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant:
(1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which
reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony or
breach of the peace, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense
against the laws;
(2) persons who the peace officer has probable cause to believe have
committed an assault resulting in bodily injury to another person and the
peace officer has probable cause to believe that there is danger of further
bodily injury to that person; ...
Article 14.04. When felony has been committed
Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the represen-
tation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the of-
fender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such
peace officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.01-.04 (Vernon 1977 and Supp. 1993).
52. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413.
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constitutional probable cause, 53 a holding that was reaffirmed in Amores.54
Amores also reaffirmed the court's previous rulings that the "totality of the
circumstances" test applies in Texas for determining probable cause for a
warrantless search and seizure. 55 Ultimately, the court found that the war-
rantless arrest in Amores was not authorized by Chapter Fourteen of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and was in violation of the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9
of the Texas Constitution.56
The Dallas court of appeals also addressed the interplay of Chapter Four-
teen of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure with the Fourth Amendment
probable cause standard in an interesting driving while intoxicated case. In
Segura v. State57 the court found probable cause to arrest Segura under the
Fourth Amendment based on what the officer saw and information given to
him by civilian witnesses.58 These witnesses said that Segura appeared intox-
icated, and was driving a vehicle that was involved in an accident. The of-
ficer did not see Segura driving the vehicle, but the officer did determine that
Segura was intoxicated when he spoke to him after the accident. The court
found that the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard was met be-
cause the officer had facts and circumstances within his knowledge, based on
a combination of what he observed about Segura and what others told him
of the incident, that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that appellant had committed the offense of driving while intoxicated. 59
The court in Segura found, however, that the more stringent standard of
article 14.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure6" was nevertheless
violated by an arrest of Segura for driving while intoxicated because the of-
ficer did not personally observe Segura driving his pickup.61 While personal
observation of the defendant driving was not required for federal probable
cause, it was required under article 14.01.62 The opinion made clear that the
establishment of probable cause under the United States Constitution does
not necessarily allow a warrantless arrest under Texas statutory law. The
court reiterated what had been previously stated in Heitman v. State:63 the
federal constitution provides a floor on constitutional rights and not a ceil-
ing. States are free to grant citizens greater rights than that given by the
United States Constitution. In Texas, Chapter Fourteen of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does just this.
Ultimately, the court in Segura upheld the arrest based on a theory of
53. Johnson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 417.
57. 826 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd).
58. Id. at 184.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 51.
61. Segura, 826 S.W.2d at 184.
62. Id.
63. 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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public intoxication rather than driving while intoxicated.64 Public intoxica-
tion does not require driving and the court found the officer had personally
observed all of the facts necessary to make the public intoxication arrest. 65
In Torres v. State66 police set up surveillance at a residence. They ob-
served Torres drive up to the residence with another person. The other per-
son exited the vehicle, went behind the residence, and was arrested for a
drug offense. The police suspected that Torres was involved in the drug
offense. They therefore ordered him out of the car, placed him face down on
the ground, and handcuffed him. After reading him his rights, the officers
discovered that Torres did not have a valid driver's license. They also found
cocaine in the vehicle Torres was driving. The State claimed there was prob-
able cause for the arrest because the officers observed Torres driving without
a license. The court of criminal appeals rejected the State's position because
the officers did not know until after they arrested Torres that he did not have
a valid license. 67 Torres indicates that the court is still willing to look behind
the facial justification offered for an arrest, even though this same term the
court of criminal appeals abandoned the "pretext arrest" doctrine.
During the Survey period, the court of criminal appeals considered the
sufficiency of an affidavit to establish probable cause in support of a warrant.
In Jones v. State68 the court reiterated the well settled rule that the suffi-
ciency of an affidavit for an arrest or search warrant is limited to the "four
corners" of the affidavit. 69 Thus, even if the affiant is aware of enough facts
to constitute probable cause, if he fails to put those facts in the affidavit they
cannot be considered in determining whether there was probable cause for a
magistrate to issue an arrest or search warrant.70 The affidavit in Jones was
insufficient because the affiant, in a conclusory fashion, stated only that he
believed that the suspect intentionally and knowingly caused the death of the
victim and, during the course of that act, took property from the victim's
residence. The failure to set forth the underlying facts for these conclusions
invalidated the warrant. 71
In State v. Martin72 the court of criminal appeals reviewed a complaint
filed in municipal court, charging Martin with a traffic offense, to determine
if the complaint contained sufficient information to support the issuance of
an arrest warrant. A complaint filed in court as a charging instrument need
not necessarily reflect the factual basis upon which the complaint is based. 73
64. Segura, 826 S.W.2d at 185.
65. Id.
66. 825 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
67. Id. at 125.
68. 833 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, Jones v. Texas, No. 92-5568,
1992 WL 227399 (S. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993).
69. Id. at 123.
70. Id. at 124 n.10.
71. Id. at 124.
72. 833 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
73. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 45.17 reads in pertinent part as fol-
lows:
"such complaint shall state: ... 2. The offense with which he is charged, in plain and
intelligible words; .... " TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.17 (Vernon 1979).
1244 [Vol. 46
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A complaint in support of an arrest warrant, however, must contain prob-
able cause to show that the accused committed a crime.74 The complaint in
Martin was sufficient because it alleged the place and day the traffic violation
occurred, and it stated that the affiant received the information about the
offense from a police officer who personally observed the offense. 75
The Dallas court of appeals addressed an interesting probable cause ques-
tion in State v. Toone.76 Toone sent several written requests to a United
States Postal Inspector for illegal videotapes and publications. The postal
inspector arranged a controlled delivery of the contraband to Toone's house.
In anticipation of the delivery and to prevent possible destruction of the evi-
dence, the postal inspector obtained a search warrant for Toone's house.
During the execution of that warrant cocaine was discovered. Toone moved
to suppress the evidence of cocaine on the theory that probable cause for the
search did not exist when the warrant was issued because the contraband
was not yet on the premises. The trial court agreed with Toone and granted
the motion to suppress. 77 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
warrant was valid because there was probable cause to believe that the con-
traband would be in Toone's house when the warrant was executed. 78
E. REASONABLE SUSPICION
The court in Viveros v. State79 stated that, in order for a stop or detention
to be legal under the reasonable suspicion standard, the officer must possess
articulable facts that create some reasonable inference of criminal conduct.
80
This means that "there must be a reasonable suspicion that there is some-
thing out of the ordinary occurring and some indication that the unusual
activity is related to crime.' ' 81 The court found that passing a moving patrol
car on an interstate highway at sixty-five miles per hour, and then slowing to
forty-five miles per hour and maintaining that speed until stopped by the
officers, is not suspicious activity which may be reasonably believed to be
related to crime.8 2 The court then held that the marijuana the officers ob-
served following the stop based on that conduct should have been
suppressed. 83
74. Article 15.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure reads in pertinent part as
follows:
[t]he complaint shall be sufficient, without regard to form, if it have these
substantial requisites: ... 2. It must show that the accused has committed some
offense against the laws of the State, either directly or that the affiant has good
reason to believe, and does believe, that the accused has committed such offense
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.05 (Vernon 1977).
75. Martin, 833 S.W.2d at 132.
76. 823 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. granted).
77. Id. at 745.
78. Id. at 747.
79. 828 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).






In Davis v. State84 the court of criminal appeals held that a police officer
had reasonable suspicion upon which to detain Davis under the following
facts: he was one of three black males standing in front of a particular apart-
ment where, according to the police dispatcher, three black males were re-
portedly selling drugs; the three men attempted to "flee" when they saw the
officer's car; and the appellant was suspiciously wearing a trench coat
although it was a warm day. 85 The court, however, disallowed the admis-
sion of evidence contained in a matchbox found during a patdown search 86
of the appellant because it was unreasonable for an officer to fear that a razor
blade or other weapon might have been hidden in the matchbox.8 7
The amount of suspicion necessary to detain members of the travelling
public was considered at least twice by the Houston court of appeals for the
First District. In Walton v. State88 the court considered the detention of an
airline passenger. A Houston police officer was working at the airport look-
ing for potential drug couriers when he spotted Walton. The officer testified
that Walton appeared nervous, which is a characteristic in a drug courier
profile. Additionally, Walton walked to the metal detector, hesitated, and
then walked away, and held his suitcase close to him. Walton later met a
Latin American male and started to walk out of the airport with him. The
officer approached Walton and asked to examine his ticket and driver's li-
cense. The names did not match. The officer asked Walton if he was carry-
ing narcotics. Walton said he was not. Walton allowed the officer to look in
his suitcase where a large amount of cash was found. He was then taken to
the police office where a drug detection dog was brought in to examine the
money and the suitcase. The dog "alerted" on both. The officer requested
Walton's identification again, took the wallet, and discovered cocaine in it.
The court held that Walton was detained at the point that the officer asked
permission to examine his suitcase. 89 The court also held that there was no
reasonable suspicion for this detention, 90 and the cocaine obtained from
Walton's wallet was obtained as a direct result of the illegal detention and
should have been suppressed. 91
In Mitchell v. State92 the court considered the detention of a bus passen-
ger. Similar to the circumstances in Walton, the police were monitoring ac-
tivity in a bus station looking for narcotics couriers. Mitchell's actions were
unusual as he entered the bus station and then boarded a bus. Three officers
approached Mitchell on the bus, asked to talk to him, and asked to see his
ticket. The officers then asked if they could look through Mitchell's bag.
Mitchell asked if he had a right to privacy and the officers assured him that
84. 829 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
85. Id. at 220.
86. During an investigatory stop a police officer who reasonably fears for his or her safety,
or that of others, may conduct a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons. Id.
87. Id. at 221.
88. 827 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
89. Id. at 502.
90. Id. at 503.
91. Id. at 503-04.
92. 831 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. refd).
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he did. The officers told Mitchell that if he preferred they could have a dog
check the bag instead. Mitchell then agreed to allow the officers to look in
his bag. The officers found cocaine and marihuana in the bag. The court
analyzed this situation by first noting that a seizure does not occur just be-
cause a police officer approaches someone and asks a few questions. 93 The
proper inquiry was whether a reasonable person in Mitchell's situation
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.94 The court held that a reasonable person would not have be-
lieved that he was free to ignore the officers or terminate the encounter and
without reasonable suspicion the detention was illegal.95 Additionally, the
court found that the consent Mitchell gave to the officers to search his bag
was not voluntary, and the evidence of drugs should therefore have been
suppressed. 96
Under Heitman v. State,97 if properly raised, 98 the courts are required to
address search and seizure issues under the Texas Constitution separately
from their disposition under the federal constitution.99 At least two Texas
courts of appeals have decided that article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitu-
tion requires no greater restrictions on police activity regarding reasonable
suspicion detentions and searches than that required by Terry v. Ohio'°°
under the United States Constitution. In Brown v. State,'0 the Dallas court
of appeals stated that there was "no Texas statute or case requiring different
or more stringent reasons than those articulated in Terry to justify a tempo-
rary detention in Texas under article I, section 9" of the Texas Constitu-
tion. 10 2 In Spillman v. State, 0 3 the Austin court of appeals came to the
same conclusion.10
F. ATTENUATION OF THE TAINT
In Brown v. Illinois105 the United States Supreme Court determined that a
confession obtained by authorities after an illegal arrest might be admitted
into evidence if the taint of the illegal arrest was attenuated before the police
obtained the confession.' 06 The Supreme Court identified four factors that
should be considered in deciding whether a confession was obtained by ex-
93. Id. at 832.
94. Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991)).
95. Id. at 833.
96. Id. at 834.
97. 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
98. "Attorneys, when briefing constitutional questions, should carefully separate federal
and state issues into separate grounds and provide substantive analysis or argument on each
separate ground. If sufficient distinction between state and federal constitutional grounds is
not provided by counsel, this Court may overrule the ground as multifarious." Id. at 690-91
n.23.
99. Id. at 682-83.
100. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
101. 830 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd).
102. Id. at 174.
103. 824 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd).
104. Id. at 811.
105. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
106. Id. at 602.
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ploitation of the illegal arrest: 1) whether the suspect was given Miranda
warnings; 2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; 3) the
presence of intervening circumstances; and 4) the purpose and flagrancy of
official misconduct. 10 7 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also applied
those four factors in deciding Jones v. State. 0 8
Jones was arrested for capital murder pursuant to a warrant based on an
affidavit that failed to set forth probable cause for the arrest. The court of
criminal appeals said that, because the arrest was illegal, it must examine
each piece of evidence obtained after the arrest in light of the factors identi-
fied in Brown in order to determine if the taint of the illegal arrest was suffi-
ciently attenuated. 10 9 The court held that the taint of the illegal arrest was
attenuated as to written confessions given by Jones and that those statements
were properly admitted into evidence. 10 The court based this decision on
the fact that Miranda warnings were given prior to each confession, there
was no official misconduct, and Jones was taken before a magistrate before
confessing. "' An oral statement given by Jones, however, was found to be
tainted because it was made almost immediately after the arrest, without any
intervening circumstances, and before Jones was taken before a
magistrate. 112
In Arcilla v. State 1 3 the court of criminal appeals made clear that finding
a consent to search to have been voluntary does not conclude the analysis of
whether the search was tainted by an illegal arrest.' 14 The trial court should
still consider the factors identified in Brown to determine if the taint of the
illegal arrest was attenuated. 1 5 In A rcilla, however, there was no need for
an attenuation of the taint analysis since Arcilla challenged only the volunta-
riness of his consent in the appellate court. 116
G. SCHOOL SEARCH
The court of criminal appeals explained the parameters of a search by
public school authorities in Coronado v. State. 117 Relying on United States
Supreme Court authority, 1 8 the court first noted that a warrant was not
required before searching a student.119 A search of a student, however, must
be reasonable. 120 In order to decide if a search is reasonable, a court must
107. Id. at 603.
108. 833 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, Jones v. Texas, No. 92-5568,
1992 WL 227399 (S. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993).
109. Id. at 125.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 126.
113. 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
114. Id. at 359.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 835 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
118. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).




determine if the search was justified at its inception. 121 This means there
must be "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evi-
dence that the student has violated, or is violating, either the law or the rules
of the school."' 122 The court must also determine whether the search was
conducted in a manner reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the search in the first place.' 23 Since the stated justification
for the search of Coronado was that he was suspected of truancy, the appli-
cation of the above principles invalidated the search of Coronado's car that
was parked in the school parking lot.124
H. ORAL CONFESSION
Oral confessions in Texas are admitted into evidence under very limited
circumstances. 125 One circumstance authorizing the admission of an oral
confession is where the confession "contains assertions of facts or circum-
stances that are found to be true and which conduce to establish the guilt of
the accused .... ,"126 The Court of Criminal Appeals made it clear in Al-
manza v. State127 that "it is the combination of the oral statement and the
subsequent discovery of previously unknown evidence independently verify-
ing the statement which provides the reliability necessary" to render the
statement admissible. 128 The oral statement by Almanza identifying mate-
rial in his bedroom at the time of his arrest as his "personal stuff" was held
inadmissible even though the "stuff" later turned out to be heroin. 129 The
court held that Almanza's statement did not lead to the discovery of evi-
dence that later verified it, and was nothing more than a mere assertion of
guilt. 130
I. INVENTORY SEARCH
Inventory searches are a well-established exception to the general prohibi-
tion on warrantless searches. An inventory search of a vehicle is permissible
under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, if conducted pursuant to a
lawful impoundment of the vehicle by the police. 13' In other words, if the




124. Id. at 641.
125. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
126. Id. § 3(c).
127. 839 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
128. Id. at 821.
129. Id. at 820-21. The ruling in Almanza appears to substantially overrule Port v. State,
791 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Port had reinterpreted Article 38.22(3)(c) to allow
admission of an oral statement that was shown to be true through other evidence even if the
statement did not lead the police to find other evidence.
130. Id. at 821.
131. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364(1976); Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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inventory search. The Supreme Court in Colorado v. Bertine132 stated that
this search is to protect the car owner's property and the police from claims
of lost or stolen property or from potentially dangerous objects in the
vehicle. 133
In Bertine, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol. After his arrest and prior to the impoundment of his vehicle, Ber-
tine's van was inventoried. Inside a backpack in the vehicle, the officers
found cocaine and a large amount of cash. The Supreme Court of Colorado
held the search to be unreasonable, in part, because Bertine himself was not
offered the opportunity to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of
the property. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that" 'the
reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily
or invariably turn on the existence of alternative "less intrusive" means.' "134
In Gords v. State135 the Dallas court of appeals was faced with a similar
question. The officers arrested Gords for assault. They then impounded his
vehicle and conducted an inventory search. During the inventory search the
police found cash, a semi-automatic rifle, and cocaine.
The Gords court defined the issue as being whether the inventory search
was reasonable under article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. 136 While
conceding that under Bertine the search may have been permissible under
the United States Constitution, nevertheless, based on Heitman v. State,137
an independent analysis under the Texas Constitution was required. 138
Gords found that "Texas courts have consistently held that impoundment is
lawful only when no other reasonable alternative is available to insure the
protection of the vehicle."' 139 This finding was contrary to the Supreme
Court ruling in Bertine. Since the State in Gords failed to prove that there
were no other reasonable alternatives available, the inventory search was
held impermissible under the Texas Constitution and the case was
reversed. 40
Gords may be the most important Texas court of appeals case during the
Survey period. Heitman decided that the Texas courts were allowed to in-
terpret the state constitution to provide more protection on search issues
than the federal constitution. However, Heitman itself provided little gui-
dance as to what situations would be appropriate for this application of in-
dependent state grounds. Understandably the courts of appeals have been
reluctant to take the first step in finding independent state grounds to disal-
low searches when Supreme Court authority would allow such searches. In
Gords, the court of appeals broke ranks with this pattern and found the
132. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
133. Id. at 373.
134. Id. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)).
135. 824 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd).
136. Id. at 787.
137. 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
138. Gords, 824 S.W.2d at 787.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 788.
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Texas Constitution to give greater protection than the federal constitution
on this issue.
It should be noted that other courts of appeals may not follow the lead of
the Dallas court on this issue. In Autran v. StateW4' the Beaumont court of
appeals dealt with a different inventory search issue and cited Bertine with
approval. 142 Autran did not address the issue of whether other arrange-
ments could be made for the safekeeping of the vehicle. Rather, the issue in
Autran was the permissible scope of the inventory search itself.143
II. FEDERAL CASES
A. CONSENT SEARCHES
A common point of contention regarding consent searches is whether the
officers exceeded the scope of the consent. United States v. Ibarra 44 is a
good demonstration of the varying approaches to the resolution of this ques-
tion. The issue in Ibarra was whether officers exceeded the consent to search
a house given to the police by a guest, when the officers forcibly broke into a
sealed attic space. 45
The officers approached the house in question and knocked on the door.
Robert Chambers answered the door and allowed the officers to enter the
house. After explaining that they were conducting a narcotics investigation,
the officers asked for Chambers's permission to search the house. Cham-
bers's reply was, "That would be all right." Chambers, however, refused to
sign a written consent to search form, explaining that the house wasn't his,
but he was staying there as a guest for a few days.
The officers began their search which led to the house's attic. They dis-
covered that access to the attic was through the ceiling of the bedroom
closet, however, the entrance to the attic was sealed off with boards. The
officers used a sledgehammer to knock out the boards in the ceiling. Once
inside the attic, the officers found nearly one million dollars in cash, ledgers
and a money counting machine.
The district court found that Chambers "freely and voluntarily con-
sented" to the search of the house and garage, but that such consent could
not have been reasonably interpreted to include a structural dismantling of
the secured ceiling-attic floor using a sledgehammer. 146 Based on this find-
ing, the items found in the attic were held to be inadmissible at trial. 47
The government appealed and a panel of the court of appeals reversed the
district court's suppression order.'148 The court of appeals then agreed to
141. 830 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, pet. granted).
142. Id. at 812. "The reasonableness of any police or governmental activity does not neces-
sarily or invariably rest on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive means.' " Id.
143. Id. at 814-16.
144. 965 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
145. Id. at 1356.
146. Id. at 1355.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1356.
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hear the case en banc. The en banc court was equally divided, therefore the
district court's suppression order was affirmed.' 49
The judges voting to affirm the suppression order, in an opinion by Judge
Jolly, relied on Florida v. Jimeno150 in framing the issue on appeal as what a
typical reasonable person would believe was encompassed within the consent
given by Chambers to the officers.' 51 Relying on the district court's factual
findings regarding the degree of force used and the extent of damage caused
when the officers broke into the attic, these judges concluded that the officers
exceeded the scope of the consent.15 2 They concluded that a general state-
ment of consent is not limitless, "[r]ather, it is constrained by the bounds of
reasonableness .... ,,153
In an opinion by Judge Duhe, the remainder of the court concluded that
the officers' conduct was not a structural dismantling of the attic entrance
and was therefore not a Fourth Amendment violation. 154 Additionally,
these judges concluded that Chambers's consent to search extended to the
attic. 15
The differing viewpoints expressed by the court demonstrate the different
philosophies underlying consent searches. The first faction of judges nar-
rowly construed the consent and found that anything other than normal
searching is outside the bounds of a general consent. The second group of
judges took the opposite view in finding that a general consent is broadly
construed and is not normally limited except in extraordinary
circumstances.
B. REASONABLENESS OF SEARCH
In United States v. Pierre'56 the court concluded that it was reasonable for
a border patrol agent to put his head inside a vehicle to address a passenger
during a routine stop at a fixed checkpoint. 57 The court further held that,
when the agent smelled freshly burned marijuana inside the vehicle, he had
probable cause and was justified in searching the vehicle and its contents. ' 58
The defendants in this case were stopped at the fixed immigration check-
point at Sierra Blanca, Texas. The agent spoke to the persons in the front
seat concerning their citizenship and then thought he saw someone in the
back seat. He stuck his head into the window to get a clear view of the
backseat and to talk to the person there. As he did, he smelled freshly
burned marijuana in the vehicle. The agent instructed the people to exit the
149. Id. at 1354.
150. 111 S.Ct. 1801 (1991).
151. Ibarra, 965 F.2d at 1356.
152. Id. at 1356-59.
153. Id. at 1358.
154. Id. at 1360.
155. Id. at 1361.
156. 958 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 280 (1992).
157. Id. at 1309.
158. Id. at 1310.
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vehicle and subsequently obtained their permission to search it. In the
course of the search, 13.8 pounds of cocaine were found.
The district court denied the motion to suppress and, after their convic-
tion, the defendants appealed. A panel of the court of appeals concluded
that the agent had conducted a search when he stuck his head into the vehi-
cle and that the search was unreasonable. 15 9 The panel further concluded
that the consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
search to cure the taint and that the district court erred in not suppressing
the evidence. 160
The court of appeals granted en banc rehearing on its own motion in order
to address this issue.' 6 1 Upon rehearing, the court initially noted that
"agents at fixed checkpoints may stop and briefly question the occupants of
any vehicle without violating their Fourth Amendment rights." 162 How-
ever, if agents wish to search vehicles or their occupants, probable cause or
consent is required.' 6
3
While not specifically deciding if the agent's conduct in placing his head
inside the vehicle was a search, the court nevertheless concluded that he
acted reasonably in doing so. 164 The court stated that, since agents have the
right to question persons at fixed checkpoints concerning their citizenship,
they have the right to conduct their questioning in an effective manner. 165
This effective questioning right includes the right of the officer to have eye
contact with the person during the exchange. 166 The court found that this
gave the agent the right to place his head in the vehicle to see the person he
was questioning. 167 The court additionally concluded that the agent's ac-
tions were no more intrusive than necessary to accomplish his objective and
therefore he had a right to be where he was when he smelled the mari-
juana. 168 Under the court's ruling, there was no illegality tainting the search
and the order of the district court denying the motion to suppress was
affirmed. 169
C. PATDOWN SEARCHES
In United States v. Rideau170 the Fifth Circuit, in a sharply divided en
banc opinion, upheld a patdown search that a previous panel opinion1 7 l had
found improper. 172 The facts in Rideau are relatively simple. An officer,
159. United States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377, 383, 385 (5th Cir. 1991).
160. Id. at 390-91.
161. United States v. Pierre, 943 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1991).
162. Pierre, 958 F.2d at 1308 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976)).
163. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567).
164. Id. at 1309.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1309-10.
168. Id. at 1310.
169. Id.
170. 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992).
171. 949 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991).
172. Rideau, 969 F.2d at 1576.
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driving through a high crime area, saw Rideau standing in the road at about
10:30 at night. The officer then observed Rideau stumble as he stepped from
the road. As the officer got out of his car he asked Rideau to identify him-
self. Rideau began to back away. The officer then reached out and patted
down Rideau's outer clothing and felt a gun. Rideau was charged with pos-
session of a firearm by a felon.' 73
In Terry v. Ohio174 the United States Supreme Court held that an officer
may conduct an investigatory detention and protective patdown when he
"observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous ....
Terry requires that the officer be justified in initially detaining the individ-
ual. 176 Additionally, the officer must be able to point to specific and articul-
able facts suggesting that the individual presented a risk of harm to the
officer or others to be justified in conducting a patdown. 177 A brief detention
is lawful when supported by specific and articulable facts that reasonably
warrant the intrusion. 178 In Maryland v. Buie179 the court reaffirmed Terry,
stating that Terry authorizes "a limited patdown for weapons where a rea-
sonably prudent officer would be warranted in the belief, based on 'specific
and articulable facts', and not on a mere 'inchoate and unparticularized sus-
picion or hunch', 'that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual.' ",180
The panel opinion of the Fifth Circuit concluded that the initial detention
of Rideau was justified based on his intoxicated appearance. 181 The court
found that the patdown was improper, however, based on the lack of articul-
able facts which would support an inference that Rideau was armed and
dangerous. 182
In reversing the panel decision, the en banc court found that the officer
acted properly in conducting the patdown of Rideau. 8 3 The court con-
cluded that it was not unreasonable for the officer to have feared that when
Rideau was backing away he was doing so in order to give himself time and
space to draw a weapon.' 8 4 Based on this conclusion, it was not unreasona-
ble for the officer to touch Rideau's pocket to determine whether he had a
gun. '85
The court found that because this encounter took place at night, in a high
173. Id. at 1573.
174. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
175. Id. at 30.
176. Id. at 21.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
180. Id. at 332.
181. Rideau, 949 F.2d at 720.
182. Id.
183. Rideau, 969 F.2d at 1576.




crime area where the carrying of guns was common, articulable facts existed
which legitimately justified the officer's actions. 18 6 The court majority, how-
ever, also stated that the fact that an individual is in a high crime neighbor-
hood at night is not in and of itself enough to support an officer's decision to
stop and frisk him.18 7
In dissent, Judge Smith, joined by four additional judges, sharply con-
tested the majority's conclusion.' 88 The dissent read the majority's opinion
as allowing the patdown of virtually anybody in a high crime area.' 89 This
result would be violative of the requirement in Terry and Buie that the officer
have a particularized and articulable suspicion before conducting the
patdown.190 According to Judge Smith, virtually any activity by Rideau af-
ter his detention would be construed by the officer as suspicious and by the
majority as sufficient justification for a patdown search. 191 The dissent con-
cluded that the real thrust of the majority opinion was to allow almost un-
limited patdown searches in high crime areas.' 92
The sharply worded decisions in Rideau show a deep division in the Fifth
Circuit over the proper scope of a Terry patdown search. For now, those
judges inclined to grant officers greater leeway in conducting patdown
searches have the upper hand. Under this opinion, a minimal amount of
suspicious activity in a high crime area may justify a patdown search, while
the same conduct in a different location may not. This opinion may ulti-
mately prompt the Texas courts to adopt a narrower interpretation of an
officer's right under the Texas Constitution to conduct a patdown search
than that given to the federal constitution by the federal courts.
D. CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS
In Fleming v. Collins'93 the Fifth Circuit explored the reach of the "public
safety exception" to the rules under Miranda v. Arizona' 94 requiring advising
arrested persons of their Fifth Amendment rights. 95 The court found the
facts under Fleming to fit within the public safety exception to Miranda. 96
The court substantially relied on the holding in New York v. Quarles.197
Fleming and two other men entered a Dallas bank armed with pistols, and
attempted a robbery. A security guard knocked a gun out of the hands of
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1576.
189. Id. at 1580-81.
190. Id. at 1582.
191. Id. at 1581-82.
192. Id. at 1584.
193. 954 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1992).
194. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings to a suspect, before officers engage in custo-
dial interrogation, concerning his right to remain silent, to have an attorney assist him, and the
fact that any incriminating statements may be used against him).
195. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
.... .U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
196. Fleming, 954 F.2d at 1112-14.




one of the robbers and shots were exchanged. As the robbers were fleeing,
the security guard shot Fleming, but he continued to run toward a used car
dealership one block away. Don Adams, who was working at the dealership,
heard a gunshot and saw Fleming running. Adams chased Fleming into a
nearby field and held a pistol on him until police arrived.
Two Dallas police officers were heading toward the bank when they saw
Adams and Fleming. They approached Adams and Fleming and ordered
Adams to drop his gun. They then determined that Fleming was one of the
bank robbers. In response to questions from the officers, Fleming stated that
the man at the bank had shot him. The officer asked him who was with him,
his name, and where the gun was. Fleming responded that he had dropped
the gun and did not get any money. He additionally said he did not shoot
the security guard, but he acknowledged that he had been involved in the
bank robbery. At the time of the questioning, Fleming had not received any
Miranda warnings, although the officer stated that Fleming was not free to
leave from the time the officer arrived.
The Fleming court explained that Miranda warnings were designed to
protect an individual's Fifth Amendment rights during custodial interroga-
tion. 198 It was acknowledged that Fleming was in custody and that at least
some of the officers's questions were interrogation, therefore, a question ex-
isted as to whether Miranda warnings were required. 199 The determinative
factor in Fleming was whether the public safety exception to Miranda, rec-
ognized in New York v. Quarles,2°° applied to this situation. The court
found that "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat
to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. '20 1
The questions as to the location of Fleming's gun were asked in order to
determine where a loaded gun had been discarded. According to the court,
to require that Miranda warnings be given before making this inquiry was
improper and, with slightly different facts, could have deterred Fleming
from answering questions that were necessary to protect the officers or by-
standers. 202 The court concluded that because the "public safety" exception
to Miranda applied, Fleming's statements were admissible despite the failure
of the officer to give him his Miranda warnings. 20 3
In dissent, Judge Williams, joined by Judge Brown, agreed that the public
safety exception was applicable to the earlier stages of the officer's confronta-
tion and questioning of Fleming.204 The initial questions concerned the lo-
cation of the gun. Judge Williams had no problem with the finding that the
public safety exception to Miranda excused the failure of the officer to advise
198. Fleming, 954 F.2d at 1112.
199. Id.
200. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
201. Fleming, 954 F.2d at 1112.
202. Id. at 1113.
203. Id. at 1113-14.
204. Id. at 1114. (Williams & Brown, J.J., dissenting).
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Fleming of his Miranda warnings at that time.205 However, the officer later
asked Fleming specifically if he had been involved in the bank robbery and
he replied that he had. The dissent found this question and answer not to be
covered by the public safety exception and therefore inadmissible at trial.2°6
In reaching this conclusion, the dissent found that any threat to public
safety passed when the officer had Fleming in custody and determined that
he no longer had a weapon.207 The dissent emphasized the narrow strictures
of the Quarles exception, pointing out that a case where it applies is so rare
that the Fifth Circuit had never applied it before.208
E. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The confusing area of when a defendant has a right to counsel received
some attention from the Fifth Circuit during this Survey period. In United
States v. Cooper209 and United States v. Carpenter,210 the court tackled the
difficult question of the difference between the Sixth Amendment 21 ' right to
counsel and Fifth Amendment 212 right to counsel.
In Cooper the defendant was in custody on a state aggravated robbery
charge. The state court appointed an attorney to represent Cooper on this
charge. Six days after appointment of counsel, a federal agent visited
Cooper in jail without informing his attorney. The purpose of the visit was
to ask Cooper about a shotgun found in the trunk of his car that was unre-
lated to the robbery for which he was in custody. The agent advised Cooper
of his Fifth Amendment rights, including the right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation. Cooper waived his right to counsel and told
the agent he had received the gun from a friend in order to have the stock
fixed. Cooper was subsequently charged iii federal court with possession of
the shotgun. The district court denied his motion to suppress his statement
to the federal agent concerning the gun.213 He was convicted and appealed
this ruling.
In Carpenter the defendant was arrested on a state burglary charge. After
taking Carpenter to the county jail, the police found a firearm and crack pipe
on the back seat floorboard of the police car. Carpenter was subsequently
appointed a lawyer to represent him on the state burglary charge, however,
his court-appointed attorney did not speak with him until weeks later. In
the interim, an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms visited
Carpenter twice. The agent advised Carpenter of his Miranda rights and
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1115.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2945 (1992).
210. 963 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 355 (1992).
211. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
212. There is no specifically delineated right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (right to counsel
indispensable to protection of Fifth Amendment privilege).
213. Cooper, 949 F.2d at 741.
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informed him that she was there to discuss the firearm discovered in the
police car. He waived his rights and then confessed that the gun and crack
pipe were his. Carpenter was charged in federal court with possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. His motion to suppress his confession to the
agent was denied by the district court. Following his conviction, he
appealed.
The question presented in both Cooper and Carpenter was whether the
appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in connection with the
state charges constituted an invocation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation about a different
offense. In both cases the court concluded that it did not.214
The courts placed primary reliance on McNeil v. Wisconsin .2 15 In McNeil
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. 216 Cooper and
Carpenter had court-appointed attorneys on their state cases pursuant to
their Sixth Amendment rights. However, in McNeil the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment right only applies to the specific offense with which the
suspect has been charged. 21 7 This right to counsel invalidates subsequent
waivers during any police-initiated interviews with the defendant only as to
the specific offense. 2 18
According to McNeil, the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit police-initi-
ated contact with defendants as to uncharged conduct. 21 9 This is equally
true of those defendants situated like Cooper and Carpenter who have coun-
sel representing them on other unrelated charges. 220
The right to counsel during interrogation concerning uncharged conduct
is found in the Fifth Amendment and is much more limited. The Fifth
Amendment right to counsel is based on Miranda v. Arizona 221 and is
designed to assist a defendant in asserting his right against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment. These Fifth Amendment rights apply to inter-
rogation by law enforcement agents about any offense, but a suspect must
expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment. 222
In both Cooper and Carpenter the courts held that a request for appointed
counsel in state court was not sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel in unrelated future custodial interrogations.223 Carpenter
left open the possibility that if the appointed counsel had demanded that
Carpenter not be interrogated in the absence of counsel, such a demand
might constitute an invocation of Carpenter's Fifth Amendment rights. 224
214. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 739; Cooper, 949 F.2d at 742.
215. 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).




220. Id. at 2209.
221. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
222. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 739.
223. Id. at 739; Cooper, 949 F.2d at 742.
224. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 740 n.3.
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However, since that specific fact was not present in either Carpenter or
Cooper, the courts have thus far declined to address it.
Both cases discuss a remaining avenue of challenge to interrogation when
a defendant has invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding a
charged offense, but has not expressly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to
have counsel present during custodial interrogation. 225 "If the charged and
uncharged offenses are 'so inextricably intertwined' or 'extremely closely re-
lated' then the Sixth Amendment (not the Fifth Amendment) prohibits in-
terrogation about the uncharged offense."'226 However, in both Cooper and
Carpenter, the charged and uncharged offenses were not found to be "inex-
tricably intertwined" or "extremely closely related," and this challenge was
therefore unavailable. 227
225. Id. at 740; Cooper, 949 F.2d at 743-44.
226. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 740.
227. Id. at 740-41; Cooper, 949 F.2d at 743;
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